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Abstract
We distinguish three ways that a theory of linguistic meaning and com-
munication might be considered dynamic in character. We provide some
examples of systems which are dynamic in some of these senses but not
others. We suggest that separating these notions can help to clarify what
is at issue in particular debates about dynamic versus static approaches
within natural language semantics and pragmatics.
In the seventies and early eighties, theorists like Karttunen, Stalnaker, Lewis,
Kamp, and Heim began to ‘formalize pragmatics’, in the process making the
whole conversation or discourse itself the object of systematic formal investiga-
tion (Karttunen [1969, 1974]; Stalnaker [1974, 1978]; Lewis [1979]; Kamp [1981];
Heim [1982]; see also Hamblin [1971], Gazdar [1979]). This development some-
times gets called “the dynamic turn”. Much of this work was motivated by
a desire to model linguistic phenomena that seemed to involve a special sen-
sitivity to the preceding discourse (with presupposition and anaphora looming
especially large)—what we could loosely call dynamic phenomena. The work of
Heim [1982] in particular showed the possibility of a theory of meaning which
identified the meaning of a sentence with (not truth-conditions but) its potential
to influence the state of the conversation. The advent of this kind of dynamic
compositional semantics opened up a new question at the semantics-pragmatics
interface: which seemingly dynamic phenomena are best handled within the
compositional semantics (as in a dynamic semantics), and which are better
modeled by appeal to a formal ‘dynamic pragmatics’ understood as separable
from, but perhaps interacting with, the compositional semantics? Versions of
this question continue to be debated within core areas of semantic-pragmatic
inquiry—for a small sampling see, for instance, recent work on presupposition
projection (Beaver [2001, 2008], Schlenker [2007, 2008, 2009], Rothschild [2011],
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Beaver and Geurts [2014], Stalnaker [2014]), on counterfactuals (von Fintel
[2001], Veltman [2005], Gillies [2007], Moss [2012]) and on epistemic modals
and indicative conditionals (Veltman [1996], Aloni [2001], Gillies [2004], Yal-
cin [2007, 2012c, 2015], Kolodny and MacFarlane [2010], Willer [2012, 2013a,b],
Bledin [2014], Stalnaker [2014]). This issue forms a key aspect of the large-scale
question what kind of shape a theory of meaning for natural language should
take.1
This paper is not an intervention into any specific debate at the semantics-
pragmatics boundary. Rather, we want to do some conceptual ground-clearing.
Several notions of “dynamicness” are often in play in such debates. Our aim
is to isolate some of these concepts and sharpen them. We will suggest that
separating these notions can help to clarify what is at issue in particular debates
about dynamic versus static approaches within natural language semantics and
pragmatics. Certain considerations may favor some notions of dynamicness
but not others. The presence of one kind of dynamicness might be motivated
independently of the presence of other kinds of dynamicness.
We isolate three ways that a fragment of language might be considered dy-
namic, corresponding to three different notions of dynamicness. To a rough first
approximation, these are:
Compositional dynamicness. The compositional semantic values of
sentences are context-change potentials—functions which map a con-
versational state to a new conversational state.
Conversation systems dynamicness. The context-change potentials
of the sentences of the language are not each equivalent to an op-
eration which adds a proposition to the background information of
the conversation.
Discourse dynamicness. The truth-conditions associated with a dis-
course as a whole cannot always be understood as the result of first
associating the sentential parts of the discourse with truth-conditions
and then combining these truth-conditions.
We refine and discuss each notion in its own section below. We will provide some
examples of systems which are dynamic in some of these senses but not others.
Before that, we review some terminology and some background assumptions.
1Recent discussions here include von Fintel and Gillies [2007], Schlenker [2009], Rothschild
[2011], Lewis [2012, 2014], Dever [2013], Stalnaker [2014], Rothschild and Yalcin [2015].
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1 Preliminaries
Following many approaches in semantic and pragmatics, we take it that it is
theoretically fruitful to work with some formal notion of a conversational state,
in part so that we can formally model speech acts from the perspective of their
characteristic effects on the state of the conversation in which they occur. Dif-
ferent frameworks model states of conversations with different sorts of objects.
Stalnaker [1978], for instance, models the state of a conversation as a set of
possible worlds, the set of worlds compatible with the presuppositions of the
interlocutors (a context set in his terminology). Lewis [1979] models conversa-
tional states via an abstract ‘conversational scoreboard’ including a number of
dimensions beyond a context set, among them a ranking of comparative salience
of objects, a parameter tracking the prevailing standards of precision, and a
component representing the possible plans of the interlocutors. Kamp [1981]
models the state of a conversation with a discourse representation structure, a
certain kind of syntactic object. Heim [1982] models the state of a conversa-
tion as a file, which formally amounts to a pair of a set of variables together
with a set of world-variable assignment pairs. Roberts [1996, 2012] models a
conversational state as a tuple of different kinds of information, one of which
is a ‘question-under-discussion stack’ used to model relevance and the inquiries
directing conversation. Veltman [1996] models conversational states as sets of
worlds paired with a preorder over worlds, the latter intended to model expec-
tation or normality. Willer [2013a] models conversational states as sets of sets
of worlds, using these to (inter alia) formally capture what it is for a possibility
to be live in conversation. Yalcin [2012b] models conversational states as sets
of probability spaces, using these to deal with probability operators and condi-
tionals. And so on.2 We will speak throughout of a domain of conversational
states, but we will be neutral as to the question how to model these states.3
We take it that when one performs a speech act, one (inter alia) makes a bid
to induce a certain dynamical change to the state of the conversation, a change
that has something intimately to do with the meaning (compositional semantic
value) of the linguistic expression that is uttered. We take this simple idea to
2And on. For just a few more examples of the diverse ways in which states of conversation
have been modeled, see Groenendijk [1999], Aloni [2001], Groenendijk et al. [1996], Bittner
[2011], Dekker [2012], Murray [2014].
3Is a (nondefective) conversation always adequately representable using single conversa-
tional state, or should we allow for multiple, perhaps different conversational states, one for
each agent in the discourse? We tend to think of matters in former way, broadly in the style
of Stalnaker [2002]; thus we will often speak of the conversational state at a given point in a
conversation. But nothing we say will turn on this, and officially we are neutral. See Stalnaker
[2014] for one recent relevant discussion.
3
be common ground between dynamic and non-dynamic theorists.
Relatedly, we take it that every sentence (or sentence in context4) has a
context-change potential (CCP). This is a function which, roughly speaking,
captures the change that uttering the sentence produces in the state of the
conversation when the speech act is accepted. A context-change potential is a
function from conversational states to conversational states.
We say “roughly speaking” because, as emphasized by Stalnaker in a num-
ber of places (Stalnaker [1978], Stalnaker [1998], Stalnaker [2014]), uttering a
sentence always produces changes to the state of the conversation which are
not themselves part of the context-change potential associated with the sen-
tence. For example, if one says ‘It’s raining in Brooklyn’ in the context of a
normal conversation, the associated conversational state will presumably be im-
mediately updated with the information that one has just asserted something.
This change to the conversational state owes, not to the CCP of ‘It’s raining
in Brooklyn’, but rather to the truism that facts that become mutually evident
to interlocutors in conversation normally become mutually presupposed in the
conversation, and thus are added to the background information incorporated
in the conversational state. In the normal case, the CCP associated with an ut-
terance of a sentence φ will act on a conversational state which already includes
the information that φ was just uttered. A textbook idea for the CCP of the
sentence ‘It’s raining in Brooklyn’ would be that it is a function that maps an
arbitrary conversational state c to a conversational state that captures all the
information that was already part of c, plus the information that it’s raining in
Brooklyn. The CCP of a sentence is always of a function of what the sentence
means.
2 Compositional dynamicness
This brings us to our first notion of dynamicness. Although the term context-
change potential emerged in the dynamic semantics literature, it is important
to be clear that one can speak with propriety of the context change potential of
a sentence without assuming in advance that the sentence, or the language it is
part of, requires a dynamic compositional semantics. The term as we use it is
neutral on that issue. Those who, like Stalnaker [2014], embrace conventional
4By ‘context’ in ‘sentence in context’, we mean the sense in play in, for example, Kaplan
[1977/1989]: in this sense, the context is the concrete location where the discourse takes
place, something formalizable as a centered world. The ‘context’ in ‘context-change potential’
adverts, by contrast, to a different notion of context—namely, the notion of a conversational
state. For some discussion of the relations between these two notions of context, see Stalnaker
[2014], Rothschild and Yalcin [2015].
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truth-conditional approaches to theorizing about meaning are not thereby pre-
vented from talking about the CCPs of sentences. What such theorists want to
reject is not the idea that sentences have CCPs, but rather the idea that the
compositional semantic value of a sentence is identical to its CCP. This is the
idea of compositional dynamicness:
Compositional dynamicness. The compositional semantic values of
sentences are context-change potentials—functions which map a con-
versational state to a new conversational state.
Something like this idea is perhaps what most theorists have in mind when they
think of dynamic semantics.
At first glance, this is a simple and straightforward idea. On this under-
standing of ‘dynamic’, dynamic semantics is meant to be a clear alternative to a
more ordinary, static truth-conditional compositional semantics in the style of,
say, Lewis [1970] or Montague [1973]. The question whether to go dynamic in
this sense is the question whether the most elegant and explanatory semantics-
pragmatics for the language fragment in question identifies the semantic values
of sentences with their context-change potentials. That would seem to be a
substantive question.
It helps to see what compositional dynamicness is supposed to contrast with.
Theorists who reject compositional dynamicness will typically hold that the
mapping from sentences to their context-change potentials is not directly given
in the semantics, but rather arises out of the interaction of a non-dynamic
semantics with separate pragmatic principles. The picture of the interaction
between semantics and pragmatics described by Stalnaker [1978] is perhaps the
paradigm example of an approach like this. Here, the compositional semantic
value of a (declarative) sentence φ is something truth-conditional (in particular,
it is a two-dimensional intension, broadly in the style of Kaplan [1977/1989]).
This object, relative to a context (centered world), determines a proposition,
the latter modeled as a set of possible worlds. The compositional semantics of
φ alone thus does not get us all the way to its CCP. To get to the CCP of φ,
we need to make reference to a further ingredient outside of the compositional
semantics proper. This is where Stalnaker introduces a pragmatic rule—the
assertion rule. The assertion rule is meant to capture what Stalnaker takes
to be a pragmatic convention of speech, namely the convention that when one
utters a sentence φ that expresses a proposition p, this is normally mutually
taken as a kind of “proposal” to change the conversational state by adding the
information that p to it. Since, for Stalnaker, conversational states are sets
of possible worlds (context sets), he cashes this out formally as a proposal to
intersect p with the context set (as it stands after the utterance is produced).
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We have, then, two big-picture ways of associating sentences with context-
change potentials. One approach embraces compositional dynamicness, and
effects this mapping directly within the compositional semantics. The other
approach rejects compositional dynamicness, and instead associates sentences
with their CCPs indirectly, through the interplay of a static semantics and one
or more pragmatic bridge principles. The bridge principles span the gap between
a sentence’s static meaning and its CCP.
The point of debate between these two big pictures seems substantive. But
capturing an interesting notion of compositional dynamicness is less straightfor-
ward than it may seem. We can bring this out by considering two systems for
interpreting an artificial propositional language L that contains only negation
and conjunction (cf. van Benthem 1996, 17-18). One will be compositionally
dynamic, one not. Both systems will employ the same models and the same
notion of a conversational state:
Defs. A model M for L is a pair ⟨W,I⟩ where W is a set of possible
worlds, and I is an interpretation function mapping the proposi-
tional letters of L to sets of worlds.
Def. A conversational state in M is any subset of WM.
The first system recursively associates sentences with meanings which are CCPs:
System 1
Def. For any M, an update function ⋅[⋅] (for M) is a function from
wffs of L to functions from conversational states (in M) to conversa-
tional states (in M) defined as follows, where α is any propositional
letter, φ and ψ are any wffs, and c is any context set in M:5
c[α] = c ∩ I(α)
c[¬φ] = c − c[φ]
c[φ ∧ ψ] = c[φ][ψ]
Def. φ is true at w iff w ∈W [φ]
Def. ψ is a consequence of a set of sentences Γ iff at any world w
where all the sentences in Γ are true, ψ is true.
Here, the compositional semantic value of any sentence φ is a CCP, viz., [φ]. So
officially we have compositional dynamicness. We want to compare this system
to the following non-dynamic system:
5We use postfix notation when formalizing CCPs.
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System 2
Def. For any M, a static semantic value function J⋅K (for M) is a
function from wffs of L to subsets of WM defined as follows, where
α is any propositional letter, φ and ψ are any wffs, and c is any
context set in M:
JαK = I(α)J¬φK =W − JφKJφ ∧ ψK = JφK ∩ JψK
Def. φ is true at w iff w ∈ JφK
Def. ψ is a consequence of a set of sentences Γ iff at any world w
where all the sentences in Γ are true, ψ is true.
This second system adopts a semantic value function mapping sentences to
propositions (sets of worlds) along ordinary static lines. We assume this system
comes packaged with a straightforward pragmatic rule of assertion, in the style
of Stalnaker:
Assertion rule. For all φ, the CCP of φ, [φ], is defined as follows: for
all conversational states c, c[φ] ∶= c ∩ JφK.
System 2 is obviously not compositionally dynamic. The thing to notice is
that despite this, it associates all sentences with just the same CCPs as System
1. In a sense, System 2 supplies a means of writing compositional dynamicness
out of the story altogether, compatible with preserving all the CCPs associated
with sentences by System 1.
When we compare System 1 and System 2, it becomes tempting to say that
compositional dynamicness was not actually present in any deep sense in System
1 in the first place (cf. von Fintel and Gillies [2007]). It becomes tempting to
say that System 1 is not “truly dynamic” (Groenendijk and Stokhof [1991a]).
After all, the possibility of a straightforward static reformulation undermines
the idea that dynamicness at the compositional level was really necessary.
The challenge, of course, is to articulate what exactly the deeper sense of
compositional dynamicness would be. If the fact that a compositional semantics
takes a dynamic shape (i.e., that it is a compositional assignment of CCPs to
sentences) does not settle whether it is “truly dynamic”, what does?
Here is one line of approach to this question that we will not take. An
intuitive idea one encounters in the literature is the idea that dynamic semantics
is distinguished by the essential role that local contexts play in the compositional
semantic process (see Schlenker [2009], Dever [2013] for two recent discussions).
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It very well may be that there is an attractive characterization of what a “truly
dynamic” compositional semantics amounts to in terms of the concept of a local
context. But we have no suggestions to offer in that vein here. Flagging this
idea as a potential line of inquiry for future work, we set it aside.
So the question remains: what (if anything) makes for a “truly dynamic”
compositional semantics?
3 Conversation systems dynamicness
We want to leave the question hanging for the moment. We turn now to our
second kind of dynamicness. Once we spell this notion out, we will have some
new resources for thinking about what interesting compositional dynamicness
could amount to.
The second notion of dynamicness applies to a language system in abstrac-
tion from its compositional semantics. It has to do only with the characteristic
forms of conversational state update that the language system allows. The
relevant level of abstraction is what Rothschild and Yalcin [2015] call the con-
versation system level of description:
Def. A conversation system is a triple ⟨L,C, ⋅[⋅]⟩, where L is a set of
sentences, C is a set of conversational states, and ⋅[⋅] is an update
function from L to a set of CCPs on C (i.e., ⋅[⋅] ∶ L→ (C → C)).
System 1 and System 2 differ in the compositional semantic values that they
associate with sentences. But they are indistinguishable at the conversation
systems level of abstraction: they each determine exactly the same conversation
system. This level of description enables us to capture, in a precise way, what
the two systems have in common.
We can use the conversation system level of description to theorize more
precisely about some vague ideas that are often associated with debates about
static versus dynamic approaches to linguistic meaning and use. In particular,
we can take a step towards formalizing the following two ideas that are often
associated with dynamic approaches, and which are sometimes thought to rec-
ommend them. The first idea is some sentences have CCPs whose effect is not,
or not merely, to add a proposition to the information captured by the con-
versational state. The second idea is that the way that the CCP of a sentence
updates a conversational state may depend on features of the input conversa-
tional state: the effect of a CCP can be sensitive to the history of the discourse,
as the latter is reflected in the conversational state. In a nutshell, here are two
ideas dynamic approaches characteristically want to reject:
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propositionality. Conversational update is always just a matter
of adding a proposition to the conversational state.
insensitivity. Conversational update is always insensitive to the
input conversational state.
These are intuitive ideas. Intuitive ideas can rarely be perfectly formalized. Still,
we can imperfectly theorize about them, using the notion of a conversational
state. We could employ formal counterparts of these ideas to isolate some
precise senses of “static” and “dynamic” at the conversation systems level of
description. This is a primary objective of Rothschild and Yalcin [2015]. (Much
of the discussion in this section will draw from this paper.)
One possible notion of an austerely static conversation system is the idea of
a system satisfying both propositionality and insensitivity. Systems 1 and
2 above are examples of systems that satisfy these two properties. Every CCP is
equivalent to an operation which adds a proposition to the input conversational
state; and the proposition which gets added is never sensitive to what the input
conversational state is.
We should like to formalize, insofar as possible, what it is to be an austerely
static conversation system in this sense. As a first step, we can observe that the
conversation system determined by Systems 1 and 2 is intersective:
Def. A conversation system ⟨L,C, ⋅[⋅]⟩ is intersective just in case
C ⊆ P(W ) for some set W , and there exists some set P ⊆ P(W )
such that for all φ ∈ L, there exists p ∈ P such that for any c ∈ C,
c[φ] = c ∩ p.
The basic notion of an intersective conversation system has often been in the
air in discussions of what makes for the distinction between a static and a
dynamic approach to meaning and use (though not under that particular la-
bel). Indeed, the technical result which is most often cited in connection with
the static/dynamic divide is a result about intersectivity, due to van Benthem.
This result isolates a pair of properties as jointly characteric of the intersective
conversation systems:
Fact 1 (van Benthem [1986]). A conversation system ⟨L,C, ⋅[⋅]⟩ is
intersective just in case for all φ ∈ L and c ∈ C:
(i) c[φ] ⊆ c (eliminativity)
(ii) c[φ] = ⋃w∈c{w}[φ] (distributivity)
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The failure of one or both of these properties is often claimed to be a key
hallmark of dynamicness (Groenendijk and Stokhof [1991a], van Benthem [1996],
von Fintel and Gillies [2007], Muskens et al. [2011]).
What is not always acknowledged in discussions of this result, however, is
that it occurs at the conversation systems level of description. Again, this level
of description abstracts from the details of the compositional semantics of the
language in question. If eliminativity or distributivity fails in the conversation
system for a language fragment, it is not obvious what consequence this has, if
any, for the semantics of the language—in particular, for the question whether
it is compositionally dynamic. This is not to say that van Benthem’s result
is not interesting; on the contrary, we think it obviously is interesting. It is
just important to keep in mind that its interest occurs at a specific level of
abstraction, and its bearing on the architecture of semantic theory far from
obvious.
Remaining at the conversation systems level, Rothschild and Yalcin [2015]
offer to capture the concept of staticness fixed upon by van Benthem with a
formal notion intimately related to, but more general than, that of intersectivity.
Here is the definition:
Def. A conversation system ⟨L,C, ⋅[⋅]⟩ is strongly static just in case
there exists an intersective conversation system ⟨L,C ′, ⋅[⋅]′⟩ and a
bijection f from C to C ′ such that f(c)[φ]′ = f(c[φ]), for all φ ∈ L
and c ∈ C.
This technical notion of staticness is more neutral about the nature of conver-
sational states than the notion of intersectivity. (The latter notion but not the
former applies only when conversational states are sets, for example.) It cap-
tures a broader variety of the possible conversation systems that manifest both
propositionality and insensitivity.
Just as van Benthem provided characterizing properties for the class of in-
tersective conversation systems, we can provide characterizing properties for the
class of conversation systems which are static in the above sense. This takes us
to a second result:
Fact 2 (Rothschild and Yalcin [2015]). A conversation system ⟨L,C, ⋅[⋅]⟩
is strongly static just in case for all φ,ψ ∈ L and c ∈ C:
(i) c[φ] = c[φ][φ] (idempotence)
(ii) c[φ][ψ] = c[ψ][φ] (commutativity)
Given Fact 2, one quite natural idea of dynamicness at the conversation systems
level is simply the idea of a conversation system that violates either idempo-
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tence or commutativity. This formal result sits naturally with much existing
discussion of what makes for dynamicness. The violation of one or both of
these properties—especially, the violation of commutativity—has often been as-
sociated with the motivation for dynamic approaches to semantics (for relevant
discussion, see Groenendijk and Stokhof [1989], Groenendijk et al. [1996], van
Eijck and Visser [2012], Lewis [2014]). Dynamic semantic systems are usually
explicitly designed to exhibit a sensitivity to the order in which the sentences
of a discourse occur. For order to matter is for commutativity to fail.
But again, dynamicness in the present sense—non-strong-staticness of the
conversation system—does not per se imply compositional dynamicness (as
Rothschild and Yalcin [2015] emphasize). It would be a nonsequitur to move
from the fact that the conversation system for a language fragment is non-static
(in the technical sense of ‘static’ just defined) to the conclusion that the lan-
guage fragment must have a compositionally dynamic semantics. This is one of
the main reasons it is important to separate these two notions of dynamicness.
Continuing the search for formally interesting classes of conversation sys-
tems, one might seek a characterization of the class of conversation systems
which accept propositionality, but which do not necessarily accept insensi-
tivity. Any approach to natural language meaning and update which fits the
stereotype of a static approach, and which construes conversational state up-
date as proposition-adding, will certainly allow that the proposition expressed
by a sentence can be a function of context; and one important feature of the
context is, of course, the state of the conversation. If the proposition that [φ]
adds to an input conversational state c can vary as a function of c, then insen-
sitivity fails, and the associated conversation system is not static in the above
technical sense. All the same, in our experience, many theorists have the feeling
that such systems should be deemed ‘static’, if only in a less austere sense of
‘static’ than the one just defined above. This feeling presumably owes to the
fact that it is easy to see how a context-sensitive (especially: a conversational
state-sensitive) truth-conditional compositional semantics could, together with
a simple Stalnakerian rule of assertion, determine a conversation system which
violates insensitivity. There are many examples in the literature with this
shape; see Rothschild and Yalcin [2015].6
Here again, however, we should be careful about levels of abstraction. If a
conversation system that is not strongly static in the above technical sense can
nevertheless be understood as determined, in part, by a context-sensitive truth-
6Indeed, it can be tempting to think that any kind of context-sensitivity, including the sort
of context-sensitivity familiar from Kaplan-like analyses of indexicals, will lead to violations of
insensitivity. But the issue here is subtle. Arguably, many textbook forms of indexicality can
be squared with strong staticness. See Rothschild and Yalcin [2015] for a detailed discussion.
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conditional semantics of some sort, then we can simply say that the semantics-
pragmatics of the language fragment in question is compositionally static, but
non-static at the conversation systems level. These notions of dynamicness just
are separable. There should not be a general expectation to the effect that any
interesting notion of dynamicness at the conversation systems level should imply
compositional dynamicness.
(This seems like a convenient place to note that we don’t particularly care
about the terminology, as long as the underlying distinctions are acknowledged.
If some theorists would prefer to reserve the word ‘static’ for the class of conver-
sation systems that obey propositionality, leaving insensitivity out of it,
that is fine with us. They will need some other name for the class of language
fragments that obey propositionality and insensitivity. We take it as ob-
vious that it is an interesting and notable fact when a fragment of language has
both of these properties. The availability of a very tidy characterization of this
class as the commutative, idempotent systems by itself suggests we have here a
natural category of conversation systems.7 We elect to call this class ‘strongly
static’.)
Since, as just noted, there exist stereotypically static approaches to meaning
and communication which violate insensitivity, it is of interest to characterize
also the class of conversation systems construable as obeying propositionality
but not necessarily insensitivity. This class of systems is intimately related
to the class of systems that are eliminative in the sense of the result of van
Benthem’s noted above. We can define this class as follows:
Def. A conversation system ⟨L,C, ⋅[⋅]⟩ is eliminative just in case
C ⊆ P(W ) for some set W , and there exists some set P ⊆ P(W )
such that for all φ ∈ L and any c ∈ C, there exists p ∈ P such that
c[φ] = c ∩ p.
We put the definition in this way to bring out how it differs from the definition
of intersective systems given above: the only difference is that we swap the final
two quantifiers. An equivalent but simpler definition of ‘eliminative’ would be:
Def. A conversation system ⟨L,C, ⋅[⋅]⟩ is eliminative just in case
C ⊆ P(W ) for some set W , and for all φ ∈ L and any c ∈ C, c[φ] ⊆ c.
7The point that the notion of a conversation system applies to fragments of language,
and not necessarily to entire languages, is important. We doubt that anyone thinks that the
conversation system appropriate for some entire natural language is static in the technical
sense we have defined. Surely any natural language supplies mechanisms for varieties of
conversational update that are not strongly static. Questions of staticness have real interest
only for targeted fragments of language.
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Eliminativity captures the idea of propositionality when, for example, con-
versational states and propositions are both modeled in terms of sets of possible
worlds (as, for example, in Stalnaker [1978]). If propositions are sets of worlds
and conversational states are sets of worlds, then update by proposition-adding
amounts to intersecting the proposition in question with the prior conversational
state. If all update is proposition-adding, then update is the sort of thing that
can change the conversational state only by eliminating possibilities.
If we are seeking a natural abstract characterization of the notion of propo-
sitionality, we do well not to stop at the class of eliminative systems. The
eliminativity property only applies when we assume that conversational states
are objects we can model as sets. But there is no particular reason to think
that the intuitive notion of propositionality requires the assumption that
conversational states must be modeled in this way. As before, we can arrive at
a more general underlying property by considering the class of systems that are
isomorphic to the eliminative systems. Rothschild and Yalcin [2015] call this
class of systems weakly static:
Def. A conversation system ⟨L,C, ⋅[⋅]⟩ is weakly static just in case
there exists an eliminative conversation system ⟨L,C ′, ⋅[⋅]′⟩ and a
bijection f from C to C ′ such that f(c)[φ]′ = f(c[φ]), for all φ ∈ L
and c ∈ C.
The class of weakly static conversation systems corresponds to one reasonable
attempt to formally cash out the idea of propositionality.
We can ask, as we did with the static conversation systems, whether this
class of systems can be independently characterized with one or more natural
formal properties. Rothschild and Yalcin [2015] show that the class of weakly
static systems corresponds to the class of systems that are antisymmetric, where:
Def. A conversation system ⟨L,C, ⋅[⋅]⟩ is antisymmetric just in case,
for all c, c′ ∈ C: if c is reachable from c′ by some sequence of updates,
and c′ is reachable by c by some sequence of updates, then c = c′.8
To state it explicitly:
Fact 3 (Rothschild and Yalcin [2015]). A conversation system is
weakly static just in case it is antisymmetric.
8The relevant notion of “reachable” is the obvious one: c′ is reachable from c in a conver-
sation system ⟨L,C, ⋅[⋅]⟩ just in case there exists a sequence [φ1], ..., [φn], with φ1, ..., φn ∈ L,
such that c[φ1], ..., [φn] = c′.
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The antisymmetric systems are the system where “there is no going back”.
This does seem to capture what is perhaps the core formal feature of propo-
sitionality. If you can at most add information to the conversational state,
then no update is such that it will take you to a state that you have already
passed. Moving back to such a state would require losing information. When
update can only be proposition-adding, update can never result in information
loss.
The class of weakly static systems provides another interesting boundary
at the conversational systems level of description.9 When we transgress this
boundary, we are not in a place where updates are all construable as proposition-
adding; and that is idea that many would associate with the language’s having,
in some interesting sense, a dynamic character.
At the beginning of the paper, we described conversation systems dynamic-
ness like this:
Conversation systems dynamicness. The context-change potentials
of the sentences of the language fragment are not each equivalent to
an operation which adds a proposition to the background informa-
tion of the conversation.
We are now in position to see why this was a rough first approximation. In
light of the various formal distinctions we have drawn in this section, and in
particular Facts 2 and 3, we can replace this with the following more refined
terminology:
Weak conversation systems dynamicness. The conversation system
of the language fragment is not both commutative and idempotent.
Strong conversation systems dynamicness. The conversation system
of the language fragment is not antisymmetric.
Thus conversation systems dynamicness breaks down into two further subno-
tions. Weak conversation systems dynamicness is compatible with the possibility
that propositionality is still true; what it is in tension with is the possibility
that propositionality and insensitivity are both true. Strong conversation
systems dynamicness, by contrast, is in a basic tension with propositionality.
Our claim certainly isn’t that our ways of formalizing the intuitive notions of
propositionality and insensitivity at the conversation systems level are the
only possible ways of doing so. We would be pleased if our discussion stimulated
further inquiry into other possible formalizations.
9See Rothschild and Yalcin [2015] for some further discussion of some other distinctions
that can be made at this level of description. See also Valby [2015] for additional results.
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4 Compositional dynamicness again
The conversation systems level of description might seem to provide a new an-
gle from which to get more of a grip on the idea of compositional dynamicness.
Given a conversation system for some language L, we can ask: is there a com-
positional mapping from any sentence φ in L to its CCP [φ] in the conversation
system? In other words, can the conversation system be recovered from some
compositional dynamic semantics? Here what we are asking is whether the
contribution that φ makes to the determination of the CCPs of complex expres-
sions in which it occurs is completely captured by [φ]. When this is true of a
conversation system ⟨L,C, ⋅[⋅]⟩, the following holds:
Substitution of update equivalents. For all sentences α,β,φ ∈ L, if[α] = [β], then for any φ, if φ is a sentence with one or more occur-
rences of α, and φα/β is the result of replacing every occurrence of
α in φ with β, then [φ] = [φα/β].
We can lay this down as a requirement on one legitimate notion of compositional
dynamicness:
Substitutability. A language L admits of a compositional dynamic
semantics relative to a conversation system for L only if the conver-
sation system satisfies Substitution of update equivalents.
We will take this to be a necessary, not sufficient, condition for when a language
admits of a compositional dynamic semantics.
If we looked only at examples like System 1 and System 2, we might get
the impression that if we have a system equipped with a static compositional
semantics, then it is always a routine matter to turn it into one with dynamic
semantic values instead. This is not so. It is a substantive fact when a conver-
sation system can be seen as induced by a compositional dynamic semantics.
To see this, and to get a sense of the content of Substitutability, we can de-
scribe a system with the following properties: (i) it has a static compositional
semantics; (ii) it has a dynamic conversation system; and (iii) its conversation
system cannot be seen as induced by a dynamic compositional semantics for the
language. Consider what we will call System 3. System 3 assumes the same
language and compositional semantics as System 2, but it adopts a very differ-
ent pragmatic update rule. Instead of the Assertion rule, System 3 employs the
following bizarre update rule:
Strange rule. For all conversational states c and sentences φ,
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c[φ] ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩p if JφK = q; otherwiseJφK
(where p, q are some particular sets of worlds such that p ≠ q.)
For notational convenience, we denote a wff and the proposition it expresses
using the same symbol, with context disambiguating; thus p = JpK, q = JqK, and so
on. System 3 is, of course, not a plausible candidate for any fragment of natural
language, but it is useful for illustrating a conceptual point. In particular, notice
that in System 3, [p] = [q], but [¬p] ≠ [¬q]. (By the definitions, for any c, c[¬p]
is just the proposition ¬p, and c[¬q] is just the proposition ¬q.) Accordingly,
there is no function which maps [p] to [¬p] and [q] to [¬q]. A fortiori there is
no way of thinking of negation as expressing such a function. There is no way
to construe the negation symbol in this system as expressing a function which
takes as its sole argument the CCP of the sentence which is its scope, and which
returns as output the CCP of the whole negated sentence. This is one relatively
clear sense in which compositional dynamicness can be said to fail.
System 3 is strongly dynamic in the conversation systems sense defined at
the end of last section, because it is clearly not antisymmetric. Nevertheless, if
compositional dynamicness is understood to require Substitutability, then Sys-
tem 3 does not admit of a compositional dynamic semantics. It is natural to
regard the compositional semantics of the language is static. Interesting dy-
namics appears at the conversation systems level, owing to the strange update
rule. The conversational dynamics generated by this rule cannot be moved into
the compositional semantics, as the context change triggered by q cannot be
identified with the compositional semantic contribution of q.
So it is a nontrivial fact when a conversation system can be matched with a
dynamic semantics that generates it. Let us say that if a semantics is composi-
tional and is such that for all φ, JφK equals [φ] as the latter is defined in some
conversation system C, then this semantics is at least surface dynamic relative
to C:
Def. A compositional semantic value function J⋅K for a set of ex-
pressions E is surface dynamic relative to a conversation system⟨L,C, ⋅[⋅]⟩, where L ⊆ E, just in case it is compositional and JφK = [φ]
for any φ ∈ L.10
10As is familiar, there are various technical notions of “compositional”. We are happy to
leave this definition as a definition-schema which can be precisified using various notions of
compositionality—though we of course assume that any compositional dynamic semantics
satisfies Substitutability.
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System 1 is surface dynamic, whereas Systems 2 and 3 are not. We can also
define a notion that separates Systems 2 and 3:
Def. A conversation system is dynamically composable if there exists
some compositional semantics which is surface dynamic relative to
it.
The conversation system of System 2 is dynamically composable (as System 1
illustrates) whereas the conversation system of System 3 is not.
Now let us pick up the thread of our earlier discussion of System 1 and 2. Re-
call we discussed the intuition, expressed in various places in the literature, that
System 1 is only superficially dynamic. Granting that the semantics of System
1 is surface dynamic, is there some nontrivial sense in which it is merely surface
dynamic? Can we frame some further notion(s) of “compositional dynamicness”
relative to which this semantics is not “deeply” dynamic?
One natural thought here would be to leverage the two notions of dynam-
icness we have already framed at the conversation systems level. We could try
saying that System 1 is dynamic, but avoidably so in a technical sense:
Def. A compositional semantics is avoidably dynamic relative to
conversation system C iff it surface dynamic relative to C and C is
strongly static.
Since any strongly static conversation system can be generated by a static com-
positional semantics for the language plus an Assertion-like update rule—we
know this because in such systems a one-one correspondence exists between [φ]
and static values JφK—we capture one sense in which it could be said that the
compositional semantics of System 1 is not “truly dynamic”: we didn’t need a
(surface) dynamic semantics to generate the corresponding conversation system.
Proceeding in this fashion, we can give matching definitions for when a
compositional semantics is (weakly or strongly) dynamic:
Def. A compositional semantics is weakly dynamic relative to con-
versation system C iff it surface dynamic relative to C and C is not
strongly static.
Def. A compositional semantics is strongly dynamic relative to con-
versation system C iff it surface dynamic relative to C and C is not
weakly static.
On this approach, the dynamicness of a (surface dynamic) compositional se-
mantics is dictated by the dynamicness of the conversation system it gives rise
to.
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These definitions of compositional dynamicness are fine as far as they go.
We bring them up in order to separate them from other notions, and in order to
note that they don’t really go very far. If a compositional semantics is (weakly
or strongly) dynamic as just defined, does it follow that its conversation system
could not also be generated by some kind of package of a static semantics plus
one or more pragmatic bridge principles? No, this does not follow. In System
3, we have already seen an illustration of the way that a static semantics might
easily give rise to very nontrivial dynamics at the conversation systems level. It
is not hard to dream up systems that fit the stereotype of a static system, and
yet give rise to nontrivial conversation systems dynamicness.
Indeed, one does not have to dream up such systems; one can find them in
the literature. Consider for example the following system, which most would
regard as an example of a static system. The system involves a trivalent static
semantics, and the matching pragmatic assertion rule reflects one standard idea
about how to deploy a trivalent semantics to model presupposition.11
System 4
Def. A trivalent model M for L is a pair ⟨W,I⟩ where I is an inter-
pretation function mapping propositional letters of L to functions
from W into {0,1,#}.
Def. A trivalent valuation function J⋅KM is a compositional mapping
from L to functions from from WM into {0,1,#}. (As for how the
connectives are defined, it doesn’t really matter for the purposes of
the present point; the strong or weak Kleene semantics for connec-
tives may be assumed, for instance.)
Def. φ presupposes ψ iff for any w, if [[ψ]]w ≠ 1, then [[φ]]w = #
Def. A conversational state for M is any subset of WM or # (the
error state).
Trivalent assertion rule. For all conversational states c in M and
sentences φ,
c[φ] ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩c ∩ {w ∶ [[φ]]
w = 1} if c ≠ # and there is no w ∈ c s.t. [[φ]]w = #
# otherwise
Such systems are clearly eliminative. Now when φ presupposes ψ, systems
like this will allow for cases where c[ψ][φ] ≠ # whereas c[φ][ψ] = #. Thus
11The assertion rule for trivalent formulas is from Stalnaker [1973]. For discussion of the
trivalent approach to presupposition see Peters [1979], Beaver and Krahmer [2001], and Fox
[2008].
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the conversation system associated with this kind of approach is not generally
commutative. This sort of system is thus generally only weakly static.
Observe further that the trivalent assertion rule is a one-to-one mapping from
trivalent semantic values to CCPs. So we can be assured that the conversation
system of System 4 could be generated by a weakly dynamic semantics.
What is the larger lesson here? The lesson is that if a compositional se-
mantics is dynamic in one of the senses defined above, it does not follow that
a dynamic semantics is unavoidable (i.e., that we couldn’t have given a com-
positional static semantics combined with an assertion rule that induces the
same conversation system).12 But recall that the alleged worry about System 1
was that it was not unavoidably dynamic—hence not “truly” dynamic. If that
really was a worry for the idea of identifying compositional dynamicness with
mere surface dynamicness, then this worry also aﬄicts the definitions of compo-
sitional dynamicness supplied above. These definitions do not capture the idea
of a conversation system which is such that it can only be compositionally in-
duced by a semantics which is dynamic in shape—that is, whose only matching
compositional semantics is surface dynamic. (Thus our definition of “avoidably
dynamic” fails to fully live up to its name.) We might call such systems (if
they exist) essentially dynamic. If there were clear examples of fragments of
natural language having this property, it would be a powerful form of argument
for dynamic approaches to compositional semantics. But it seems to us that the
relevant technical notion of “essentially dynamic” is elusive. Our aim has been
to draw this out.
One overall reaction to this state of affairs is deflationary: perhaps there
just is no interesting notion of compositional dynamicness going beyond surface
dynamic. A second reaction is to keep looking. As noted earlier, it may be
possible to define an interesting notion of compositional dynamicness in terms
of the concept of a local context: the idea might be that a truly dynamic
compositional semantics is one that makes essential use of local contexts. The
challenge for this kind of characterization is (at least) to formally clarify the
relevant notions of “essential use” and “local context”.
Meanwhile, we should like to criticize one kind of motivation for seeking
an interesting characterization of when compositional dynamicness is absolutely
needed. It is sometimes assumed that static semantics has some sort of presump-
tive status, that we should resort to a dynamic semantics only if we must—if we
can find no way to state a static alternative covering the same data. This view-
point encourages the question: how do we tell when compositional dynamicness
12For another example, consider the superficially static approach to epistemic modals given
in Yalcin [2007], which gives rise to basically the same kind of conversation system as that
generated by the weakly dynamic semantics of Veltman [1996].
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is absolutely needed? While this question may or may not have an interesting
answer, it is far from clear what would motivate the background viewpoint. We
can discern no sense in which static approaches to meaning and communication
are ceteris paribus simpler, in some way that would accord them presumptive
status.
5 Discourse dynamicness
Even if we consider a language that is equipped with a static, truth-conditional
semantics and a static conversation system—say, a system in the general shape
of System 2 above—there is still room for another kind of dynamicness to
emerge. This is what we call discourse dynamicness:
Discourse dynamicness. The truth-conditions associated with a dis-
course as a whole cannot always be understood as the result of first
associating the sentential parts of the discourse with truth-conditions
and then combining these truth-conditions.
Discourse dynamicness has to do with the way that conversational states are
mapped to truth-conditions. The simplest possible mapping between a conversa-
tional state and its truth-conditions is the one assumed by Stalnaker (Stalnaker
[1975, 1978]): on his view, conversational states just are truth-conditions; the
mapping is the identity function. But most dynamic systems we find in the liter-
ature build more structure into conversational states than just truth-conditions.
That means there is a gap between conversational states and their associated
truth-conditions. A kind of dynamicness can emerge owing to this gap.
Discussions of (what we are calling) conversation systems usually involve
some particular idea about how conversational states are supposed to be mapped
to their truth-conditions. We can make this component of the story explicit.
Suppose ⟨L,C, ⋅[⋅]⟩ is a conversation system. Consider a function t from C intoP(W ), where intuitively, t maps states in C to their truth-conditions: t(c)
is the way the world is, according to conversational state c. Call a pair of a
conversational state together with a function from its states to truth-conditions
an extended conversation system. Our terminology from earlier carries over
straightforwardly: an extended conversation system is strongly (weakly) static
just in case it extends a strongly (weakly) static conversation system.
Any extended conversation system ⟨L,C, ⋅[⋅], t⟩ induces an object we can call
its truth-conditional counterpart :
Def. Given an extended conversation system ⟨L,C, ⋅[⋅], t⟩, its truth-
conditional counterpart is the triple ⟨L,P,R⟩, where P = {t(c) ∶ c ∈
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C}, and where R is a function which takes any φ ∈ L to a relation on
P such that for all p, q ∈ P , Rφ(p, q) iff for some c, c′ ∈ C: t(c) = p,
t(c′) = q and c′ = c[φ].
If, given some extended conversation system, you can get from state c to state
c′ by updating with [φ], then its truth-conditional counterpart will contain
states p and q such that p is the truth-condition for c, q is the truth condition
for c′, and p and q are Rφ-related. The truth-conditional counterpart of a
conversation system is a way of capturing the system’s dynamics from a purely
truth-conditional point of view.
The truth-conditional counterpart of an extended conversation system is
not necessarily a conversation system itself. Rφ is a relation, and may not be
a function. Only when it is a function (for any φ in the relevant L) is it the
case that the truth-conditional counterpart is itself a conversation system. If
you have an extended conversation system in which there exist distinct states
c, c′ such that t(c) = t(c′) but t(c[φ]) ≠ t(c′[φ]), then the truth-conditional
counterpart of this system is not a conversation system itself, because there will
be more than one set of truth-conditions p such that Rφ(t(c), p). Within such a
counterpart system we cannot think of φ as updating t(c) to yield a unique new
state; rather there is more than one state it is update-related to. This reflects
the obvious fact that if the updates in your extended conversation system can be
sensitive to more about a conversational state than just its truth-conditions, the
update dynamics of the system won’t be fully captured by its truth-conditional
counterpart.
Related to this, an elementary fact is the following:
Fact 4. If an extended conversation system is static, it does not
follow that its truth-conditional counterpart is a static conversation
system.
This is to say that even if you have a static compositional semantics and a
static conversational system, it may nevertheless be the case that you cannot
construe the truth-conditions of any given conversational state as determinable
in a simple additive way, that is, by associating each item of the discourse
with truth-conditions, associating the starting conversational state with truth-
conditions, and then simply conjoining these truth-conditions.
We can illustrate by example. Consider System 4. The language is very
simple: it contains only the atomic fragment At of the language of predicate
logic, excluding the use of constant terms. So we have only things like Fxy, Gz,
and so on. In particular we have a stock of variables {x1, x2...}, and for every
m ∈ N, a set {Fm1 , Fm2 ...} of m-place predicates. We associate predicates with
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intensions in the style familiar from quantified modal logic. A model M for for
the language is a tuple ⟨W,D,I⟩ where: W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
D is a domain of possible individuals; I is an interpretation function taking a
predicate Fki and world w ∈W to a (possibly empty) set of k-tuples of objects
from D. A variable assignment g maps each variable xi to some g(xi) ∈D.
Now choosing some particular model, the semantics maps sentences of At to
sets of assignment-world pairs in the model, as follows:
JFki (x1, ..., xk)K = {⟨g,w⟩ ∶ ⟨g(x1), ..., g(xk)⟩ ∈ V (Fki ,w)}
We assume that conversational states in System 4 are also modeled by sets of
assignment-world pairs (from the same model). Let K be the set of such states.
We assume update works exactly in the style of the Assertion rule from System
2:
Assertion rule. For all φ ∈ At, [φ] is defined as follows: for all con-
versational states c ∈H, c[φ] ∶= c ∩ JφK.
So the conversational state of System 4 is ⟨At,K, ⋅[⋅]⟩. Obviously System 4 is
strongly static in the technical sense. Now consider the following mapping t
from conversational states in H to their truth-conditions (i.e., to sets of worlds
in the model H is based on):
t(c) = {w ∶ there is some g such that ⟨g,w⟩ ∈ c}
This kind of mapping from conversational states to truth-conditions is familiar
in the literature (cf. Heim [1982], Groenendijk and Stokhof [1991b]).
Now it is not hard to see that the truth-conditional counterpart of ⟨At,K, ⋅[⋅], t⟩
is not even a conversation system, let alone a static conversation system. We
can give a concrete illustration. Suppose we consider an initial conversational
state co containing four assignment-world pairs:
c0 = {⟨g1,w1⟩, ⟨g1,w2⟩, ⟨g2,w1⟩, ⟨g2,w2⟩}
We consider two objects a and b that exist in both w1 and w2. Relative to w1,
only a is in the extension of predicates F and H, and only b is in the extension
of G. Relative to w2, only a is in the extension of predicates G and H, and only
b is in the extension of F . Furthermore, g1(x) = a, and g2(x) = b.
Now what we want to examine is the way the truth-conditions of the con-
versational state evolve under the impact of different discourses. In particular,
let us compare c0[Fx][Hx] and c0[Gx][Hx]. It helps to have a diagram:
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Figure 1: Discourse dynamics despite a static conversation system.
The graph above the horizontal line in Figure 1 depicts the relevant fragment of
the conversation system for System 4. The two arrows out of c0 take you to the
state as updated by [Fx] and by [Gx], respectively, and the arrows out these
resulting states each take you to their respective updates on [Hx]. The graph
below the horizontal line depicts the relevant fragment of the truth-conditional
counterpart for System 4. The states in this graph are truth-conditions (sets of
worlds). The dotted lines from states in System 4 to truth-conditions correspond
exactly to the function t in the extended conversation system ⟨At,K, ⋅[⋅], t⟩. The
dashed arrows between the truth-conditional counterpart states correspond to
the relation RHx.
Notice that the truth-conditions of the states c0, c0[Fx], and c0[Gx] are the
same: these distinct states each leave open exactly the same possible worlds.
They differ only in the range of variable assignments each world left open is
paired with. But that difference makes for difference in the way that these states
are apt to be updated by [Hx]; and that difference in turn affects the truth-
conditions of the resulting updates. The key fact here is that although c0[Fx]
and c0[Gx] have the same truth-conditions, c0[Fx][Hx] and c0[Gx][Hx] have
different truth-conditions. (The state c0[Fx][Hx] calls for there being a single
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thing that’s both F and H—only w1 fits that bill—whereas c0[Gx][Hx] calls
for there being a single thing that’s both G and H—only w2 fits that bill.)
Although the update [Hx] can be thought of as simply intersecting the input
conversational state with a certain set of assignment-world pairs, the effect ofHx
on the truth-conditions of an input conversational state cannot be understood
in this way. The effect that Hx has on the truth-conditions of a conversational
state depends on features of the input state other than its truth-conditions—it
turns on what possible values for variables remain available for each world still
left open.
The point here is trivial from a formal point of view, but it has some con-
ceptual importance. For it highlights an important way in which the truth-
conditions of a discourse might fail to be a simple sum of the truth-conditions
of its component parts—even if the semantics of the language is static in shape,
and even the conversation system is strongly static in the technical sense (com-
mutative and idempotent).
Dynamic views are sometimes motivated by an idea Yalcin [2012a] calls
discourse primacy :
Discourse primacy. It is fundamentally entirely discourses that have
truth-conditions (or more broadly, informational content). Individ-
ual sentences have truth-conditions in at best a derivative sense,
insofar as they have some potential to impact the truth-conditions
of a discourse.
What we have just observed is that this thesis is quite compatible with a static
conception of meaning.
6 Conclusion
Our aim has been to tease apart notions of dynamicness at the compositional,
conversation systems, and discourse levels of description. The notions of com-
positional dynamicness and of discourse dynamicness seem to us particularly
under-explored.
A key fact that the preceding helps to clarify and bring into focus is the fact
that one can in principle maintain a static compositional semantics compati-
ble with robust conversational systems-level dynamicness and compatible with
robust discourse-level dynamicness. Thus if we find linguistic evidence that
suggests conversation systems-level or discourse-level dynamicness is present in
some fragment of natural language, we cannot necessarily leap to the conclusion
that a dynamic compositional semantics is necessary.
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On the other hand, we also don’t see much reason to suppose that a dynamic
semantics should be given only when it is unavoidable. First, as we have noted,
it is unclear whether we can make any technical sense of the relevant notion
of “unavoidable”. Second, it is anyway unclear why unavoidability should be
the standard—that is, why there should be some kind of presumption against
a dynamic approach. If the preceding brings anything out, it is that systems
based on canonically static semantics can in fact be very powerful. They do
not represent some kind of austere, minimal starting point as compared to
dynamic approaches. We have yet to make out any interesting sense in which a
static semantics-based approach could be called the simpler hypothesis, in a way
that would accord such approaches presumptive status.13 Static approaches are
certainly more traditional and familiar, but whether they are simpler is a very
different matter.
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